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ABSTRACT 
The use of a participative approach to ergonomics is growing in countries throughout the world. This 
paper compares and contrasts Participatory Ergonomics programs in two U.S. and two Japanese 
manufacturing plants. All four programs focused on the redesign of repetitive manufacturing jobs to 
reduce physical stress on workers. In all four cases, this traditional ergonomics concern was addressed in 
a non-traditional way-involving broad participation of many manufacturing functions who worked 
together as an ergonomics team and direct input from operators whose jobs were redesigned 
The participatory ergonomics programs were successful in making significant numbers of job changes 
in both countries. A comparison of the ergonomics programs across countries revealed some significant 
differences in structure and process. An overarching difference was in how participation was managed In 
the Japan cases, participation was a carefully controlled process by which upper management and staff 
specialists worked through first-line supervisors to get input from workers meeting in quality (or safety) 
circles. In the U.S., multi-functional and multi-level task forces (including union and worker representa- 
tives) were formed and operators were invited to meetings to give input. The U.S. plants gave the task 
force a great deal of autonomy and virtually all decisions were group decisions. The differences suggest 
that effective participatory ergonomics programs can take many forms. The best program for any 
particular plants in differing countries depends on their own unique history, structure, and culture. 
0169-8141/89/$03.50 © 1989 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of a participative approach to ergo- 
nomics is growing in countries throughout the 
world (Imada, in press). This paper compares and 
contrasts Participatory Ergonomics (P.E.) pro- 
grams in two U.S. and two Japanese manufactur- 
ing plants. All four P.E. programs focused on the 
redesign of repetitive manufacturing jobs to re- 
duce physical stress on workers through reduc- 
tions in fatigue, improvements in working posture, 
and elimination of other risk factors associated 
with cumulative trauma disorders and low back 
pain (Chaffin and Baker, 1970; Armstrong et al., 
1986; Nagamachi, 1983; Garg et al. 1978). In all 
four cases, this traditional ergonomics concern 
was addressed in a non-traditional way--involv- 
ing broad participation of many manufacturing 
functions who worked together as an ergonomics 
team and direct input from operators whose jobs 
were redesigned. 
The use of small group problem-solving meth- 
ods has a long tradition in the United States, 
going back at least to the famous Hawthorne 
experiments of the 1930s. In the 1940s, Kurt Lewin 
and his associates at the University of Michigan 
further developed concepts of group dynamics as 
applied to practical problem solving and experi- 
mented with these methods in industry (French 
and Bell, 1987). However, the Japanese are given 
credit for successfully disseminating group prob- 
lem-solving methods on a broad scale in the form 
of quality circles (Cole, 1979). U.S. companies, 
witnessing the tremendous success of the Japanese 
in mobilizing their workforce for productivity and 
quality, began to organize "Americanized" ver- 
sions of quality circles. While the Japanese version 
began with the goal of improving quality through 
statistical quality control (Juran, 1967), U.S. plants 
had the goal of improving human resource utili- 
zation and labor relations by focusing on group 
dynamics and motivational aspects of small group 
activities. Participative management, quality of 
worklife, and employee involvement are American 
terms which define small groups activities as part 
of a new human resource management philosophy 
(Kanter, 1983). 
By several measures, the Japanese quality circles 
have far surpassed their U.S. counterparts. In a 
study comparing 110 Japanese-factories to 110 
U.S. factories, Hull et al. (1988) find the Japanese 
factories were more likely to have quality circles 
(76% in Japan compared to 18% in the U.S.) and 
the rate of employee suggestions is far greater in 
Japan (mean yearly suggestion rate of 11 per 
employee in Japan as compared to 0.1 per em- 
ployee in the U.S.). Among plants that had quality 
circles, an average of 72% of the workers par- 
ticipated in Japanese plants, while only 19% par- 
ticipated in the U.S. * 
Despite the widespread use of small group ac- 
tivities in both the U.S. and Japan, the use of 
ergonomics to reduce injuries, illness, and fatigue 
has not been a central mission of these programs. 
The underlying philosophy of quality circles is 
that workers should have responsibility for and 
directly participate in the continual improvement 
of their work and therefore the goals and methods 
of ergonomics would seem to be a natural part of 
this participative process. However, Ishikawa 
(1968) in one survey found that 50% of the 
Japanese circle activities focus on quality control, 
40% on productivity and cost considerations, and 
only 10% on safety and other affairs. While a few 
companies such as Mitsubishi (one of our four 
cases) have developed safety circles as an adjunct 
to quality circles, safety circles typically focus on 
prevention of accidents and acute trauma rather 
than the redesign of work to reduce cumulative 
trauma disorders, low back pain, and fatigue. On 
the U.S. side, the emphasis on problem-solving 
groups as part of an egalitarian management phil- 
osophy has led to a hands-off management ap- 
proach in the selection of problems. Groups select 
their own problems which at least at first focus 
mainly on improving hygiene factors (e.g., install- 
ing soda machines, improving ventilation, reduc- 
ing noise levels). However, these groups are not 
trained in ergonomics and hence any ergonomics 
problems identified are merely incidental. 
The case study approach used here provides an 
in-depth look at structure and process of the ergo- 
nomics programs. As Rogers (1983) observes, we 
* These statistics were collected in 1982 in the U.S. and in 
1983 in Japan. We suspect that U.S. companies have made 
some strides in quality circles since that time, but by no means 
enough to catch up to the Japanese. 
know too little about the variables influencing 
adoption of innovations at a systems level to 
conduct large-scale surveys of plants. Nonetheless, 
the case study approach has its limitations. Our 
ability to test specific hypotheses is weak, and it is 
unclear whether the findings generalize to a larger 
sample of plants. Rather, the purpose is threefold: 
First, the cases illustrate that a participative ap- 
proach to ergonomics is viable in both countries 
and can lead to an impressive number of job 
improvements. Second, the cases suggest ways in 
which participatory ergonomics programs adapt  to 
the local structure and culture of the company and 
national environment. Finally, the approaches 
taken by these companies provide models of par- 
ticipatory ergonomics which other companies can 
adapt  to their own needs and environment. 
MODELS OF PARTICIPATION 
No consensus has yet emerged on the correct 
definition of participative management.  Much of 
the heated debate between Locke and Sashkin 
(Sashkin, 1986; Locke et al., 1986) focused on 
rather subtle differences in definition of the con- 
cept. Rather than enter that thorny debate, we will 
take the view that there are many different models 
of participation, each with their own merits and 
weaknesses. Figure 1 represents six models of 
participation that will be helpful in analyzing the 
differences between the U.S. and Japanese P.E. 
programs. 
Each of the six models is a unique combination 
of two dimensions. The column titles across the 
top represent three modes of participation taken 
from the Vroom-Ye t ton  model (Vroom and Yet- 
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ton, 1973).* In the individual consultative model, 
managers consult their subordinates on an individ- 
ual basis to get their input, but still make the final 
decision. In the group consultative models, 
managers assemble their subordinates in a group 
meeting and consult the group to get their input 
and again management  makes the decision. In 
group consensus, managers meet with their sub- 
ordinates and through discussion as a group 
achieve consensus on the best decision. 
The titles of the rows in Fig. 1 represent the 
distinction between direct and representative par- 
ticipation in the seminal experiments by Coch and 
French (1948). Direct participation means each 
employee participates directly in decisions about 
their own work. Representative participation 
means that employee representatives are selected 
to represent the viewpoints of a large number  of 
workers. Elected union officials are one form of 
representative participation. 
By combining the two dimensions, six models 
of participation emerge. At the lowest level of 
participation (Model I) worker representatives give 
their suggestions on a individual basis to manage- 
ment. In Model II, workers individually give direct 
input, but management  makes the decision. Tradi- 
tional employee suggestion programs are an exam- 
ple of Model II. At the other extreme, Model VI 
represents direct participation by all employees 
via consensus decision-making. If management  
gives quality circles the autonomy to make deci- 
sions and all employees participate, this would 
examplify Model VI participation. 
As we will see below, none of the four P.E. 
programs fit exactly into any of the six models. 
However, these models will help clarify differences 
between the U.S. and Japan programs. 
Level of 
Participatlon 
(Coch & French, 1948 
Representative 
Direct 
Individual Group Group 
Consultation Consultation Consensus 
I l I I  V 
II IV VI 
Mode of Participation (Vroom & Yetton, 1973) 
Fig. 1. Models of worker participation. Note: Shown are six 
models of worker participation based on combinations of Coch 
and French's (1948) two levels of participation and Vroom and 
Yetton's (1973) three modes of participation. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Researchers in the United States and Japan 
independently worked with manufacturing plants 
to organize and evaluate pilot participatory ergo- 
nomics programs between 1982 and 1987 (Naga- 
* Vroom also included several modes of autocratic decision- 
making in his model (the manager makes the decision), as well 
as delegative decision-making (the decision is delegated down- 
ward with no management involvement). 
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machi, in press; Liker et al., in press). The Japanese 
plants were the Mitsubishi engine plant and the 
Daikin air conditioning plant. The U.S. plants, an 
auto stamping plant and an auto assembly plant, 
were both part of the same manufacturer. 
Evaluation methods included independent as- 
sessments of risk factors associated with physical 
stress on jobs in two of the plants before and after 
changes by ergonomics committees, qualitative 
observation of meetings and review of minutes, 
periodic interviews with key participants in the 
programs, and limited medical surveillance. In 
1987, the first author visited the two Japanese 
companies and interviewed managers and staff 
members who were key participants in the ergo- 
nomics programs. 
CASE BACKGROUNDS 
The ergonomics programs in all four plants are 
atypical in the degree to which ergonomics was 
linked to employee participation. The programs in 
all four plants stand out in their countries, and 
within their own companies in this respect. In fact, 
each program is viewed by its respective company 
as a pilot program from which learnings can be 
disseminated to other plants. 
In all four cases, the development of the pro- 
grams were admittedly influenced by university 
faculty who strongly advocated that the plants use 
some form of group problem-solving with worker 
participation. Nonetheless, the specific participa- 
tive structure and processes used by the plants 
were determined by plant management and staff. 
A brief background on each of the plants provides 
the context for our analysis. 
U.S. auto stamping 
This fifty-year old plant stamps out body parts 
for several vehicle lines (mainly older vehicles). In 
1985, when the ergonomics program began, the 
plant employed about 2200 hourly workers and 
325 salaried employees. By the time the P.E. pro- 
gram was in operation for two years, hourly em- 
ployment had been reduced to 1500 and another 
substantial reduction in force was already planned. 
Throughout this period, quality and productivity 
were continually improving. A shift from an auto- 
cratic management style to a more participative 
approach is believed to be a major reason for the 
impressive productivity and quality improvements 
of this plant. Like quality circles, the participative 
program centered on employee problem solving 
groups who met weekly for about one hour. More 
recently, the plant has been shifting to self-di- 
rected work teams who meet on a less formal 
schedule. 
The automotive division of which this plant 
was a part had funded a multi-year university 
program of basic ergonomics research, training, 
and consultation. As part of the broader grant, the 
stamping plant program focused on researching 
participatory approaches to ergonomics (Liker et 
al., in press). The stamping plant was selected as 
the study plant because of the plant manager's 
strong commitment to ergonomics and the plant's 
reputation for innovative human resource manage- 
ment programs. After sending a considerable 
number of managers and professional staff to 
university training courses sponsored by the divi- 
sion, the plant manager and union leaders agreed 
to work with the university to set up a more 
organized, participative approach to ergonomics 
and allow researchers to evaluate the program. In 
exchange, a graduate student assigned to collect 
data on the program's progress would attend all 
ergonomics meeting, provide technical support, 
and provide training to the ergonomic's groups. 
University faculty also provided special ergonom- 
ics training in the plant under division sponsor- 
ship. 
The main purpose of the ergonomics program 
in this plant was to improve the quality of work 
life for operators. While productivity might also 
increase, management emphasized that they felt 
obligated to provide a safe and healthy workplace 
and that was the first priority. The program con- 
tinues to be active as of 1988. Because of the 
downsizing and cost-cutting programs, the ergo- 
nomics program has not been well funded and has 
had to survive considerable turnover of manage- 
ment, staff, and operators. 
U.S. auto assembly 
This plant assembles large luxury automobiles. 
As of December 1987, the plant employed 3200 
hourly workers. Car sales for the plant were strong 
when the ergonomics program started and re- 
mained strong as long as the program was tracked. 
Like the stamping plant, this vehicle assembler has 
one of the most active employee participation 
programs in the corporation. Management be- 
lieves the participative programs are a major rea- 
son why the plant enjoys an exceptional quality 
record and examplary labor relations. The worker 
participation program started in 1981, and as of 
1987, 10% of hourly employees participated in 
problem solving groups that met weekly for about 
1 hour (30 groups of 9-10 people). 
The formally structured ergonomics program 
began in 1986 as a joint union-management pro- 
gram. This plant is part of the same division as 
stamping and hence covered by the same 
division-wide ergonomics program. However, un- 
like the stamping plant, it was not formally selected 
as a research site. The plant requested assistance 
in setting up an ergonomics program and a par- 
ticipative approach was suggested as a preferred 
way of organizing. Union officials and manage- 
ment mutually agreed the participative approach 
was consistent with the plant's labor-relations 
philosophy. Like the stamping plant, the assembly 
plant was provided special training by university 
faculty and ongoing support from a graduate stu- 
dent in ergonomics. 
The main purpose of the ergonomics program 
was to reduce medical costs, raise productivity, 
improve quality, and improve the health of oper- 
ators in the plant. The assembly plant ergonomics 
program was still active in 1988 and growing 
steadily. 
Daikin air conditioning plant 
The Sakai complex of Daikin makes mid-size 
air conditioners, primarily for commercial use. 
This complex in 1987 employed about 700 hourly 
workers. Sakai is the mid-sized of three Daikin 
locations in Japan. The complex includes several 
plants. Sales are strong and quality is high. The 
complex has a very active quality circles program 
with participation by virtually 100% of their hourly 
workforce. Problem-solving meetings are held 
monthly. 
The ergonomics program was started as a pro- 
active attempt to enable senior workers to perform 
jobs with a minimum amount of physical stress. 
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The proportion of workers over forty at Saikai 
increased from 22% in 1976 to 49% in 1985 and is 
forecasted to reach 52% by 1990. The proportion 
of workers over fifty was 7% in 1976 and is 
expected to reach 20% by 1990. 
Since aging of the workforce is a national con- 
cern, the Japanese Department of Labor provided 
support to fund this innovative pilot program. The 
support went directly to Daikin who hired Profes- 
sor Nagamachi as a consultant. 
In 1982, the plant's newest line was selected for 
ergonomic improvements. The line was completely 
redesigned using ergonomics principles in 1982 
and then completely redesigned a second time in 
1986 (a second D.O.L. grant was won for the 
second wave of changes). In addition to ergo- 
nomic improvements to most jobs, particularly 
heavy jobs were automated which reduced the 
number of workers and increased productivity sig- 
nificantly.* In this paper we focus on the first 
wave of changes only (which took place between 
May and August of 1982). As of August 1987 no 
other lines had been redesigned using ergonomic 
methods. 
Mitsubishi engine plant 
The Mitsubishi complex in Kyoto assembles 
engines and performs some machining operations 
(e.g., grinding crankshafts). Mitsubishi prided it- 
self on being a safety conscious company even 
before the ergonomics project. In addition to qual- 
ity circles who met monthly, the same groups also 
meet monthly for one hour as "safety circles." 
Safety circles are led by the supervisor of an area 
and virtually 100% of hourly workers participate 
in meetings. In many Japanese companies quality 
circles meet after normal working hours on unpaid 
time, but at Mitsubishi, the quality and safety 
circles meet during paid working hours and the 
line is stopped to hold the meetings (if the line is 
stopped for other reasons, the circles can have 
extra meeting time). While Mitsubishi has safety 
circles throughout their plants, the Kyoto plant 
* The second wave reduced the number of workers from 60 to 
45, while output increased from 400 to 500 units/day,  a 66% 
productivity increase. Since half of the workers in the plant are 
" temporary" workers, the loss of jobs was handled by letting 
go temporary workers. 
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was the first to use safety circles to address ergo- 
nomic concerns. 
In late 1980, Kyoto management became con- 
cerned because workers were reporting high levels 
of fatigue. In October of 1981, Professor Naga- 
machi was invited to lecture on ergonomics; his 
presentation emphasized the relationship between 
working posture and fatigue. Nagamachi then sug- 
gested they organize a steering committee to col- 
lect data on working posture. The company set up 
a steering committee and decided to use their 
safety circles as the main vehicle for collecting 
data and suggesting improvements. The program 
was still active as of August 1987. Throughout 
that time the focus of the program has been 
exclusively on working posture. 
DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISON OF U.S. 
AND JAPAN ERGONOMICS PROGRAMS 
Program structure 
The structure of each program provides a 
snapshot of each Participatory Ergonomics pro- 
gram. We group the two U.S. programs together 
as they were so similarily structured (see Fig. 2). 
U.S. Cases 
The striking similarity between the two pro- 
grams was partly due to the influence of their 
outside consultant who suggested various options 
for program structure. However, all decisions 
about program structure and membership were 
made by the plants. For example, each plant de- 
cided not  to attempt to tie the ergonomics pro- 
gram to their existing employee problem solving 
groups as employees in these programs have com- 
plete autonomy to choose their own projects and 
ergonomics could not be pushed onto their al- 
ready full agendas. 
Both plants were organized into several autono- 
mous areas, each with their own area manager. 
They both decided to organize ergonomic groups 
within areas. In the case of the relatively small 
stamping plant, two areas covered all of the oper- 
ations in the plant and thus two groups were 
organized covering all of the major staff functions 
in that area with representative hourly operators, a 
union representative, and engineers assigned to 
the area as group leaders. The assembly plant 
chose one area as a pilot and the area managers 
elected to lead the groups themselves, thus provid- 
ing a higher level of authority on the committee 
compared to the stamping plant. Beyond this, the 
make-up of the ergonomics groups were quite 
similar in both U.S. plants. In both plants, repre- 
sentative hourly workers were selected by union 
and management leaders. 
The ergonomics groups received several hours 
of training up front (one half-day at assembly and 
two half-days at stamping). Thereafter, training 
became an ongoing effort. Most members went to 
several day courses offered as part of the 
division-sponsored program and the graduate stu- 
dent assigned to the plant provided short spe- 
cialized sessions on particular analysis techniques. 
The ergonomics groups met each week for about 
one hour. Virtually all of the problem-solving and 
decision-making was in fact done in group meet- 
ings. In these meetings they select jobs for analy- 
sis, evaluate jobs for physical stressors, design 
solutions to reduce major stresses detected, and 
follow-up on implementation of the solutions. 
Since the groups include engineers, managers of 
the skilled trades, skilled trades workers, and a 
representative of the union, most solutions can be 
implemented without major obstacles. 
Both plants had a policy of direct, consultative 
participation (Model II) to be implemented by 
inviting the operator (typically from the day shift) 
and supervisor of the job to at least one meeting 
to solicit their input. (In fact, ergonomics groups 
varied in the extent to which they actually fol- 
lowed through on inviting operators and super- 
visors to meetings. Even when invited, operators 
and supervisors did not always attend the meet- 
ings.) 
The ergonomic techniques used to evaluate 
stress on jobs were a combination of computer 
software, the NIOSH Work Practices Guide 
(NIOSH, 1981) and subjective judgements by par- 
ticipants. The evaluations were based on video 
tapes of the operation. The main computer soft- 
ware used was a 2D static-strength model of man- 
ual lifting (Chaffin and Andersson, 1984) and an 
energy expenditure model (Garg et al., 1978). 
These were used when deemed necessary to sup- 
plement the collective judgements of group mem- 
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a Manager Plant Medical 
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I E.I, Coordinator ( facilitatOr ) Process Engineer I 
~k Union Committeeman Tool Engineer 
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nion Health & Safety Operators (2-5) 
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Fig. 2. Program structure in U.S. auto plants. 
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bers which were guided by checklists designed by 
each plant for their own use. 
Daikin 
This company established a "steering commit- 
tee," led by the Director of General Affairs, to 
oversee the ergonomics efforts and make all final 
decisions, while input was provided by quality 
circles via the supervisors of each part of the line 
(see Fig. 3). The steering committee met three 
times for one-half day each between May and 
August of 1982 (when the line was changed). The 
first of these three meetings was devoted mainly to 
training. 
Most of the actual analysis and design took 
place outside of committee meetings, primarily 
through the efforts of the general affairs manager 
working with industrial engineering. This included 
all specialized analyses and coordination of the 
program. Supervisors collected the more subjective 
data (using structured questionnaires and inter- 
views) at quality circle meetings. 
CHIEF SECRETARY, UNION 
SAFETY GENERAL AFFAIRS MGR 
LINE MANAGER I.E. MANAGER 
SUPERVISOR INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER 
(SUPERVISOR  (SUPERVISOR, CSUPERVISOR, 
Fig. 3. Daikin ergonomic program structure for air conditioner 
assembly line. 
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Four different methods of data collection were 
used to evaluate each of the 24 jobs on the line 
(Nagamachi, 1981, in press): First, quality circle 
members on each of the 55 jobs filled out a job 
stress questionnaire to rate the degree to which 
various aspects of the job were problematic. Sec- 
ond, the supervisors used the JDLC II (Job De- 
sign for the Life Cycle), a structured job evalua- 
tion questionnaire, based on interviews with oper- 
ators at quality circle meetings. Third, an in- 
dustrial engineer and the general affairs manager 
performed analyses using JDLC I, a more com- 
plex version of JDLC II. Finally, the I.E. and 
general affairs manager viewed video tapes of 
selected jobs to analyze the amount of time spent 
in each of nine working postures (for 24 of the 
jobs). 
All data were analyzed by an industrial en- 
gineer, who had been trained along with the steer- 
ing committee and given personal tutoring by the 
consultant. He quickly became skilled at using 
each of the four data collection and analysis meth- 
ods above. Ideas for redesign came partly from the 
quality circles, but most redesign was handled by 
industrial engineering. All data and suggestions 
for redesign were presented to the steering com- 
mittee for discussion and final approval. 
Mitsubishi 
The structure of the program at Mitsubishi 
appears on the surface virtually identical to that of 
Daikin (see Fig. 4), but the scope was many times 
larger and the actual division of labor somewhat 
different. 
Mitsubishi designed their ergonomics program 
to cover most of the plant from the start. Like 
Daikin, they formed a steering committee led by 
the Director of General Affairs. The steering com- 
mittee was trained in working posture analysis 
which was the focus of the ergonomics effort. 
After working with selected safety circles on a 
small number of cases, this committee developed a 
training program based on an internally written 
training manual. The steering committee met 
monthly for the first year of the program and then 
held update meetings 15 times over the next five 
years. 
All production supervisors were trained in pos- 
ture analysis based on the nine-posture system 
( CONSULTANT ~,~ 
HEALTH MGR. I.E. MANAGER 
SAFETY MGR. 
PRODUCTION MGR. 
IND. REL MANAGER 
MEDICAL DOCTOR AREA MANAGERS (13) 
(SOPERV,SOR  (,SUPERV,SOR  (SOPERV,SOR  
Fig. 4. Mitsubishi engine plant ergonomic program. 
developed by Nagamachi (1981, in press) and they 
in turn trained their direct reports, members of 
their safety circles. Safety circle members esti- 
mated the proportion of time they spent in each of 
the nine postures and this was used as a basis for 
redesigning problematic jobs. Most of the redesign 
was done in safety circle meetings led by the 
supervisor. Supervisors then presented proposed 
solutions to their area manager who presented 
them for approval to the steering committee. Small 
changes could be made by circle members them- 
selves without higher approval. Any large changes 
involving design of major pieces of equipment 
were handled by industrial engineering (there were 
only four such cases out of 900 job changes). 
Program process 
A comparison of ergonomic design processes 
used in the U.S. and Japanese programs shows 
very different approaches to "participatory" prac- 
tices. Figure 5 summarizes the roles of various 
individuals and groups in the four plants. Again, 
the two U.S. plants are grouped as their processes 
were virtually identical. 
First, consider the role of individual compared 
to group effort. In the U.S., the multi-functional, 
and multi-level ergonomics teams had a strong 
role in every step of the ergonomics design process 
(with the exception of the more technically com- 
plex objective job analysis run by the university 
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Select Jobs 
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* In the second year of the U.S. assembly plant program, responsibility was given to each committee member to review jobs outside of meeting time and report their observations 
to the groups. This greatly accelerated the process of job analysis. 
Fig. 5. Ergonomic design process in the U.S. and Japan plants. 
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student). Even approving solutions and monitor- 
ing implementation were handled mainly by these 
groups. 
By contrast to the U.S. cases, the Japanese 
companies had a more explicit division of labor 
between different individuals and groups at differ- 
ent levels of the organization. The Daikin plant 
was most heavily dependent on individual effort 
at the middle management and staff level, outside 
of group meetings. The steering committee guided 
the process through planning and decision-mak- 
ing, the general affairs manager and I.E. per- 
formed technical analyses, redesigned the jobs, 
and monitored implementation. The main role of 
the supervisors and quality circles was to provide 
data to the general affairs manager and I.E. 
The Mitsubishi plant was the most heavily de- 
pendent on the direct involvement of workers and 
TABLE 1 
Outcomes of the participatory ergonomics programs 
U.S. auto U.S. auto Daikin Mitsubishi 
stamping assembly air conditioning engine 
Period observed 6/85-11/87 8/86-11/87 5/82-8/82 6/82-8/87 
Number of months 29 months 16 months 4 months 50 months 
Number of redesign projects 79 112 14 900 
Redesign projects/month 2.7 7 3.5 18 
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their supervisors. While planning and final ap- 
proval was handed by the steering committee, 
most analysis and redesign came from the safety 
circles themselves. However, implementation was 
managed by supervisors and industrial engineers, 
with little direct involvement of the safety circles. 
Second, consider the role of worker participa- 
tion in these cases. In terms of the typology of 
participative approaches described earlier, the U.S. 
plants used a combination of direct involvement 
of worker representatives (those selected for the 
ergonomics teams) in consensus decision-making 
(Model V) and individual consultation with oper- 
ators of jobs being redesigned (Model II). Daikin 
used direct consultation with quality circles (Model 
IV) mainly for subjective job analysis. Finally, 
only Mitsubishi used some direct group consensus 
(Model VI), though with a strong role for the 
supervisor who served as the link between the 
safety circles, the steering committee, and in- 
dustrial engineering. 
In sum, the U.S. plants depended most heavily 
on group problem-solving for all stages of the 
ergonomic design process, though workers whose 
jobs were redesigned had a voice only indirectly 
through a representative or directly in a consulta- 
tive mode. The Japanese plants relied on input 
from all workers involved through the mechanism 
of quali ty/safety circles, though this was in a 
purely consultative mode at Daikin and was chan- 
neled through the first-line supervisors at both 
plants. In both Japanese plants there was a highly 
structured division of labor between groups and 
individuals, management and workers, and staff 
and line. 
Program outcomes 
Outcomes of the programs in terms of numbers 
of "redesign projects" per month are shown in 
Table 1. All changes were made to improve pos- 
ture, reduce fatique, or in some other way reduce 
physical stress. They were all based on ergonomic 
evaluations using the concepts and tools covered 
in training. In most cases multiple changes were 
made to a single job or, far less frequently, a 
single type of change (e.g., the same tool change 
for twenty jobs) was made to multiple jobs. We 
counted each case as one "redesign project." Thus, 
each redesign project involved the complete design 
process, from selection to analysis to solution de- 
velopment to implementation. 
One might argue that counting changes to jobs 
is not meaningful as the changes may not be 
ergonomically sound. Quantitative evaluations 
(using ergonomics analysis techniques) of ten re- 
design projects, before and after the changes, in 
the U.S. Stamping plant (Liker et al., in press) and 
all of the redesign projects in the Daikin plant 
(Nagamachi, 1983) showed that all jobs had been 
improved on at least one dimension (e.g., energy 
expenditure, back stress, posture). In n o  cases 
examined were jobs made more stressful on any 
dimension. In the case of Mitsubishi, analysis was 
only done before the charges were made. The first 
224 redesign projects are summarized by Naga- 
machi (in press). The most common causes of bad 
posture were due to handling heavy parts (37%), 
inadequate table height (25%), and poor working 
position relative to the equipment (14%). Common 
solutions included redesigning the tables, some 
form of automation, changing the height of instru- 
ment gauges, and adding hoists. 
By far, Mitsubishi made the greatest number of 
job changes per month (averaged across the four 
years of the program). By using safety circles, they 
mobilized a large number of problem solving 
groups (approximately 100) whose output natu- 
rally exceeded that of the few teams at the other 
plants. This is not to say they were more produc- 
tive. We do not know the actual output per per- 
son-hour of time invested in the program. 
Daikin's changes per month fall between the 
two U.S. cases. However, what is impressive about 
Daikin is the speed of their start-up and imple- 
mentation. Their 14 jobs were analyzed, rede- 
signed, and implemented literally during the first 
3.5 months of the ergonomics program. All of the 
changes were made by outside vendors during one 
week in August when the plant was shut down. 
Moreover, they had analyzed about twice this 
number of jobs, concluding only these 14 war- 
ranted ergonomic redesign. While Mitsubishi chose 
to focus on only one dimension for evaluation and 
redesign, that of posture, Daikin was able to use a 
comprehensive battery of analysis techniques due 
to the knowledge and skill of their industrial en- 
gineer and general affairs manager. 
The U.S. cases took 4-5  months in training and 
organizational meetings before even getting off the 
ground. In a fraction of this time, the Japanese 
programs were launched and operating. However, 
the greater emphasis on preparation of the U.S. 
plants may have been necessary to the success of 
the group approach used by these teams in all 
phases of problem solving and decision making. 
The relatively high rate of job changes in the auto 
assembly plant may have had something to do 
with the fact that the area managers led the teams, 
hence assuring prompt follow-through by team 
members and the skilled trades who implemented 
job changes. The U.S. plants used the most techni- 
cally sophisticated job analysis procedures, though 
these were run exclusively by the university stu- 
dents assigned to the committee. 
Summary of similarities and differences 
Key features of the programs are summarized 
in Table 2. The programs were similar in a num- 
ber of ways: 
1. All four were considered successful pilot 
programs by their companies so that they were 
getting a particularly high level of attention and 
resources. 
2. All four plants had strong existing employee 
participation programs (by their company's stan- 
dards) in which employees met in small groups to 
solve problems. 
3. The focal point of all four programs was an 
ergonomics committee including representation 
from a variety of functions (e.g., engineering, 
safety, medical, industrial relations, the union, 
production management, etc.). 
4. All four programs led to changes in a signifi- 
cant number of jobs and limited external evalua- 
tion suggests these were ergonomically sound 
changes. 
5. While these programs used a participative or 
" team" approach, there was a judicious blending 
of individual and group effort in all four cases. In 
each case leaders were appointed or emerged who 
took responsibility for learning to use ergonomics 
analysis tools, running meetings, and expediting 
ergonomic changes. 
The U.S. programs were also different from the 
Japanese programs in significant ways: 
1. Program initiation. A concerted effort was 
made in the U.S. plants to involve the auto in- 
dustry union (U.A.W.) as a full partner in the 
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program, while in Japan the company unions were 
informed, in Mitsubishi, and involved, in Daikin, 
at a relatively low level and with little special 
effort. 
2. Training. The University was a major driv- 
ing force in the U.S. programs. For example, in 
the U.S. plants a graduate student was assigned to 
meet weekly with committees throughout the pro- 
gram and serve as the ergonomics expert. By 
contrast, the Japanese plants were much more 
self-sufficient, developing their own technical ex- 
pertise and using their consultant for initial train- 
ing and occasional advice. 
3. Program structure. Despite the usual char- 
acterization of Japanese management as being 
more "participative" than the U.S., the Japanese 
programs were more hierarchical than the U.S. 
programs. The Japanese ergonomics committee 
was a high-level plant-wide committee, decisions 
were top down, ideas were bottom up, the chain of 
command was observed faithfully (e.g., via pro- 
duction supervisors), and specialized staff func- 
tions were used extensively for training, analysis, 
and implementation. Hourly worker input was 
obtained via the production supervisor who led 
their quality circles. By contrast, the ergonomics 
committees in the U.S. programs were decentral- 
ized (in specific areas), included shop-level union 
representatives, production worker representa- 
tives, and often production workers were invited 
directly to meetings. 
4. Worker participation. The U.S. plants inten- 
tionally steered clear of mixing ergonomics with 
their existing participative programs, while the 
Japanese plants used existing employee problem- 
solving groups to work on ergonomics. This was 
particularly effective at Mitsubishi as they already 
had established "safety circles". 
5. Analysis tools. The ergonomics technology 
used in the Japanese firms for evaluating jobs, 
particularly in Mitsubishi, was based more on 
qualitative judgements than the U.S. technology, 
therefore enabling the plants to be more self-suffi- 
cient in the analysis stage and use more broad 
participation in job analysis. In the case of 
Mitsubishi, the plant chose to focus their program 
on reducing fatigue through improvements in 
working posture (Nagamachi, in press). Estimates 
of time spend in each of eight postures (from 
desired neutral to awkward) was the only analysis 
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TABLE 2 
Summary description of participatory ergonomics programs in four plants 
U.S. Stamping U.S. Assembly Daikin Mitsubishi 
Purpose Job security for Reduce fatigue 
senior workers, 
increase productivity 
Program Dept. labor-university Plant hires consultant, 
Initiation contract, university-plant Union permission, 
negotiation, Plant-wide meeting 
Involve union 
Training 
Improve quality of Lower medical 
work life (QWL) costs, raise 
productivity, 
improve QWL 
Division-level contract with university, 
University-plant negotiation, 
Involve union, 
invite worker participants 
Multiple university training courses + 
ongoing training by graduate student 
2-day training for 
steering and plant staff 
Program Steering comm. + Area. ergo. Steering comm.--approves 
Structure area ergo. comms, comms. Staff do all tech. work 






Hourly representatives on ergo. 
committees + operators invited 
to meetings 
2D static strength, 
Energy expenditure, 
Posture analysis program, 
Checklists (designed by each plant) 
Project-by-project funding + 
Internal skilled trades + Limited use 










Dept. of labor funding + 
Internal budget set up for 
equip. + Outside contractors 
Consultant trains trainers, 
Trainers train 50 area mgrs. + 
150 supervisors, 
Supervisors then train circles 
Steering comm.--approves, 
Area managers manage, 
Plant staff design equipment, 
Supervisors train/lead, 
Safety circles provide da ta /  
suggestions 
Safety circles 
provide data + 
suggestions 
Posture analysis 
Project-by-project funding + 
Changes by circles + 
Internal skilled trades + 
Outside contractors 
procedure. Thus, supervisors could be trained 
easily in the technology. The Daikin group used a 
broader set of analysis methods, but the two Job 
Design for the Life Cycle methods (JDLC 1&2) 
and the stress questionnaire were all based on 
worker assessments of their work situation. The 
U.S. plants also relied on judgements by commit- 
tee members for most of their analysis (guided by 
checklists), but used computer software for quan- 
tifying specific problems which was run exclu- 
sively by a university student. 
6. Implementation resources. Daikin organized 
their program, analyzed a complete production 
line, and made changes to every job in a two-week 
shut down period. Mitsubishi was able to change a 
phenomenal number of jobs in four years using 
internal labor, contract labor, and the safety circles 
themselves. Implementat ion seemed to be more of 
a barrier in the U.S. plants who relied primarily 
on internal skilled trades to perform the labor. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There were clear similarities between the two 
Japanese programs and the two U.S. programs, 
and clear differences across countries. There were 
too many differences across plants and nations to 
make strong claims about the cause of these dif- 
ferences. For example, were the differences due to 
culture or were they due to the different ap- 
proaches of the consultants in each country? We 
have argued that the actual program structures 
were determined by the plants, but not without 
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some influence of the consultants. Nonetheless, we 
feel some conclusions can be drawn from these 
cases. 
First, a participative approach to ergonomics 
can work in very different contexts using different 
approaches. In all four plants a significant number 
of jobs were changed. In the two U.S. plants and 
in Mitsubishi, the program had significant staying 
power. After several years in operation, groups 
were still meeting and using ergonomics methods 
to improve jobs. Each plant used different cate- 
gories of personnel for their programs and there 
were different approaches to worker participation. 
Rather than argue one approach was true worker 
participation and others were not, we suggest that 
each approach is appropriate in the right context. 
Second, there may be a trade-off between tech- 
nical sophistication of ergonomics analysis tools 
and the ability of plants to use broad participation 
and remain technically self-sufficient. More com- 
plex technology means more heavy reliance on 
outside experts. Mitsubishi was able to proceed 
with a minimum of training of quality circle mem- 
bers because they focused only on posture using a 
very simply analysis procedure. Daikin used more 
sophisticated analysis methods, but relied on a 
few technical experts in the plant to execute these 
analyses--quality circle members were less di- 
rectly involved in decision-making compared to 
Mitsubishi. The U.S. plants used the most com- 
plex analysis tools and only worker representa- 
tives truly participated in consensus decision mak- 
ing. These representatives were given special train- 
ing for their role, training which was not given to 
operators invited to meetings to express their 
opinions on changes to their job. Moreover, all 
complicated quantitative analyses in the U.S. 
plants were performed by a graduate student on 
loan from the university. 
Third, there do appear to be cross-national 
differences that influenced the design and imple- 
mentation of the ergonomics programs across U.S. 
and Japanese plants. 
One notable difference is the role of existing 
employee problem-solving groups across coun- 
tries. U.S. employee participation programs are 
typically part of an attempt to transform the labor 
relations climate from one based on adversarial 
relations to a joint partnership between labor and 
management. As such, the program purports to 
give power, influence, and dignity to hourly em- 
ployees who for decades were treated as a pair of 
hands. This includes the power to set their own 
agendas as problem solving groups. Management 
treads lightly when it comes to upsetting the de- 
legate balance that exists between reverting to the 
old autocratic climate and gaining labor's trust 
that the new "participative" climate is real and 
stable. Management in both U.S. plants in this 
study flatly refused to mix the ergonomics pro- 
gram with their existing program of employee 
problem-solving groups. They felt the groups had 
their own heavy agendas and to impose ergonom- 
ics on them would be contrary, to the vohintaristic 
philosophy of the programs. 
In contrast, Japanese managers had no hesita- 
tion about using their quality circles (or safety 
circles) for ergonomics. Japan's quality circles were 
established in a cooperative labor relations climate. 
The unions are enterprise unions rather than in- 
dustry unions and there is little of the tension that 
exists in the U.S. (Cole, 1979). Japanese quality 
circles were established to improve quality, not to 
transform the management climate. Participation 
is considered an employee moral obligation to the 
company, not a voluntaristic act ivi ty-- the virtual 
100% participation rate in both Japanese compa- 
nies illustrates this point. Moreover, it is quite 
common for management to "suggest" to em- 
ployees that they work on specific problems. For 
example, Cole (1979, p. 201) writes about the 
highly publicized job redesign of the Toyota auto 
body shop: 
" . . . t he  emphasis is not on participation per se, but rather on 
achieving the consent of workers for policies which manage- 
ment wants to pursue, as well as guiding workers in the 
direction in which management would like to see them 
move. . .we have here a carefully controlled participation in 
which management often takes the lead informally or formally 
in initiating policies that workers are then guided to accept and 
pursue." 
The participatory ergonomics programs in 
Japan examplified this "carefully controlled par- 
ticipation". At Daikin, the workers were mainly a 
source of data. In Mitsubishi they contributed 
ideas for solutions as well as occasionally even 
implemented simple changes; however, the re- 
sponsibility was in the hands of the supervisor. 
A second major difference across countries was 
the role of the first-line supervisor. In the U.S. 
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plants the supervisor had no formal involvement 
in the ergonomics program and no training in 
ergonomics. He or she was occassionally invited to 
meetings and informed when one of their jobs was 
to be worked on. Indeed, there was greater effort 
to get the input of the operator to maintain the 
participative climate. The usurping of the tradi- 
tional power of the first-line supervisor has been a 
major obstacle in employee participation pro- 
grams in U.S. plants (Kanter, 1983; Hackman and 
Oldham, 1980). By contast, the supervisor played 
a central role in the Japanese participatory ergo° 
nomics programs. Cole (1979, p. 210) also ob- 
served this trend in the Toyota auto body shop 
and noted that when they shifted to a more "par- 
ticipative" work team concept the supervisor's role 
was actually strengthened: 
".. .Management's idea was that by strengthening the role of 
the foreman through shifting many functions previously car- 
tied out in the personnel department to the shop level, they 
would be able to increase worker participation. This is because 
the foreman can more effectively absorb the ideas of sub- 
ordinates than can distant functionaries. In short, there ap- 
pears to be no conflict between increasing worker participation 
and the strengthening of the foreman role. The Japanese brand 
of worker participation clearly relies on principles of hierarchical 
control." (italics added) 
Fourth, none of the programs relied exclusively 
on direct participation of all hourly employees in 
consensus decision making. Rather, each of the 
models were some blend of models I-V described 
earlier in the paper. The expertise required for 
ergonomics is sufficiently complex that it may be 
impractical to expect workers throughout a plant 
to analyze and redesign their own jobs without 
assistance from personnel, medical, and engineer- 
ing staffs. Mitsubishi came closest to accomplish- 
ing this, but was able to do so by limiting their 
analysis to posture. 
Finally, we believe that the approach needs to 
be adapted to the context- - i t  cannot be simply 
copied. There were some differences between 
countries that reflect the different structure and 
culture of industry across nations, and there were 
differences in programs across companies within 
country. We do not believe any of the programs 
could have simply been transferred unmodified to 
another company. 
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